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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

lN THE l\IATTER OF 11 HE ESTATE

Case
OF
PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH,

No 8628

Deceased.

BRI:bJF OF APPELLANT DAVID K. W ATKISS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal is frmn a judgment of the trial court
filed on Dece1nber 10, 1956 vacating and setting aside the
Order appointing the administrator.
The Order was Inade on petition of Fanners Mutual
Autmnobile Insurance Cmnpany, a corporation.

The

basis of said petition is that it has a policy of public
liability insurance which requires it to defend and pay
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clain1s against the Estate of the deceased and would be
put to great cost and expense in defending the action by
Rawlinkiewicz.
The grounds for voiding the Order appointing the
adlninistrator was that there were no assets of Leigh
within the State of Utah.
Fr01n the order voiding the appoinbnent of David
K. W atkiss as the ad1ninistrator of the Estate of Leigh
this appeal has been taken.
Throughout this brief the adn1inistrator will be referred to as appellant and the objector, Fanners Mutual
Automobile Insurance Con1pany will be referred to as
respondent.
STATE!lENT OF FACTS
Leigh died at Knolls, Tooele County, rtah on the
29th day of .l\iay, 1955. At the ti1ne of her death she
was a resident of the State of ::Minnesota. In the collision causing the death of Leigh, Edward Rawlinkiewicz
suffered serious personal injuries and da1nage to his
autOinobile.
Other than the wreeked autonwbile Leigh had no
assets within the

~tate

of Utah. On the 3rd of Noveinber,

1955 a petition wa8 filed on behalf of Edward R.awlinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
kiewicz for the appointluent of an adininistrator of the
Estate of Leigh. The petition set forth the accident and
the fact that no adn1inistrator had been appointed for
Leigh and that there were assets within the State of Utah
consisting of a public liability insurance policy covering the autouwbile that Leigh was driving.
An order fixing a tiine for hearing was set. No objections were filed. Notice of hearing was given by the
County Clerk of Tooele County to J. B. Hag1nan, Jr.,
representative, Insurance Adjushnent C01npany, Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.
On the 22nd day of Dece1nber an order appointing
David l{. Watkiss as the adininistrator was signed.
On the 4th of January, 1956 the petition to revoke letters
of adininistration was filed by respondent.
The petition to revoke the letters of adininistration
w.as heard before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett on the
2nd of Nove1nber, 1956 and on Dece1nber lOth, 1956 the
order was nmde voiding and vacating the order appointing the administrator.
SL!l\ll\lAHY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN VOIDING AND VACATING
THE ORDER APPOINTING THE ADMINISTRATOR.
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A.

THE PROBATE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AN

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER
THE ESTATE SO THAT IT MAY BE PROPERLY ADMINISTERED.
B.

THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE

PROBATE COURT REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH.
POINT II
RESPONDENT HAS COVENANTED TO DEFEND THE
ACTION OF RAWLINKIEWICZ IN UTAH.

POINT III
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE CAN ONLY BE SERVED
BY PERMITTING SUIT IN UTAH ON INJURIES SUFFERED
IN UTAH.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN VOIDING AND VACATING
THE ORDER APPOINTING THE ADMINISTRATOR.

The order voiding and vacating the appointlnent of
the adrninistrator statP~ that the b.a~i~ of the Court's
adion was that thPre are no a~~Pt~ of the Estate within
the State of Utah.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'rhi~

basic proposition was set forth in the petition

of respondent to revoke the letters of administration and
in .addition the petition set forth that since the respondent was not authorized to do business within the State
of Utah that the judg1nent which could be obtained
against the ad1ninistrator of the Estate of Leigh by
Rawlinkiewicz would be ineffectual for any purpose.
The petition also pointed out that Rawlinkiewicz was
seeking as the creditor of the Estate of Leigh to have
an administrator appointed so that there would be within
the State of Utah a person who could be sued and that
only where the respondent was .authorized to do business could there be any effectual means of collection
instituted and a judg1nent obtained against it.
The petition points out that the respondent would be
put to great cost in order to defend the action instituted
by Rawlinkiewicz. It apparently being the theory of
respondent that the insurance c01npany should not be
required to defend an action against their insured in
any state except where they are authorized to do business.
~1_1he

action c01n1nenced by Rawlinkiewicz against the

ad1ninistrator of the Estate of Leigh was brought under
the

provision~

of Section 78-11-12 Utah Code Annotated,

1953 which reads as follows :
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"78-11-12. INJURY TO PER S 0 N OR
DEATH-NO ABATEMENT OF CAUSE OJT
ACTION UPON DEATH OF \VRONGDOER-A C T I 0 N AGAINST PERSOXAL REPRESENTATIVE OF \VROXGDOER-EVIDE1'CE
REQUIRED. Causes of action arising out of
physical injury to the person or death, caused by
the wrongful act or negligence of another, shall
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and
the injured person or the personal representatives
or heirs of one meeting death, as above stated,
shall have a cause of action against the personal
representatives of the wrongdoer; provided, however, that the injured person or the personal
representatives or heirs of one meeting death
shall not recover judgment except upon sonw competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of said injured person."
The jurisdictional statutes covering the .appointment
of ad1ninistrators is Section 75-1-:2 Utah Code Annotated,
1953 which reads as follows:

"75-1-2. \VHERE \YILLS PROVED, AXD
LETTERS nRAKTED. \\~ills 1nust be proved
and letters testamentary or of ad1ninistration
granted:
(1) If the decedent w.as a resident of the
statP, in the county in which he had his residence
at the tin1e of his death.

(2) lf the decedent was a nonresident of the
state: first, in the county in which he may haYe
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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died leaving estate therein; second, in any county in which any part of the estate may be, the
decedent not having left estate in the county in
which he died, or having died without the state.
( 3) In all other cases, in the county where
application for letters is first made."
What the Legislature intended, when a resident
person is injured by a negligent non-resident deceased,
is the basic question presented by this appeal.
The Inechanics of just how this action

IS

to be

brought was not covered cmnpletely by the survival
statute, Section 78-11-12, however, the Utah Law, as
it has developed, n1akes unnecessary any additional provision. Section 75-1-2 had been on the books of the State
of Utah for many years and has been the subject of
nu1nerous decisions concerning jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
A. THE PROBATE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING JURISDI·CTION OVER THE ESTATE SO THAT
IT MAY BE PROPERLY ADMINISTERED.

This Court has, on two separate occasions, had
before it contentions that the Probate Court did not
have jurisdiction to appoint an administrator because
there were no

asset~

within the State. Both cases de-
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cided that it was not necessary that there be property
within the State of Utah in order to appoint an administrator for the deceased person. Both cases interpret Subsection 3 of Section 75-1-2 which reads as follows:
"(3) In all other case~, in the county where
application for letters is first made."
to mean that in cases where there is no property appointrnent can be rnade where application is first rnade.
The first c.ase to discuss the rnatter was In re
Tasanen's Estate, :25 Utah 396, 71 Pac. 984. In Tasanen's
estate a non-resident of the State of Utah ·was suing a
non-resident corporation which was doing business within the State. Utah Savings and Trust Company had
been appointed the adrninistrator of the estate of deceased non-resident. Objection 'IYas rnade upon the
grounds there was no jurisdiction to rnake the appointrnent. It was clairned and conceded that the undisputed
evidence disclosed that the deceased was not a resident
of Weber County, State of Ptah, and did not leaYe an
estate within the State of Vtah. The Diamond Coal &
Coke Cornpany which petitioned to set aside and vacate
the order appointing Utah SaYings .and TruM Cornpany
as the adrninistrator set forth as a basis that there was
no pstate or assets within {Ttah whieh could be administ<>r<'d and as a eonsPqH<-'IH'e that the District Court of

\VPIH·r County w.as without jurisdietion to appoint a~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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administrator for the deceased r_rasanen. '11he district
court sustained the ad1ninistrator and the Dianwnd
Coal & {joke Cmnpany appealed. The Court set up the
lJa~ic

questions in the following language:
''The Inain questions to be decided in this case
.are: (1) Can the district court appoint an adIninistrator of the estate of a nonresident deceased, where the only assets of said estate consist of a right of action against a resident of
this state, or ( 2) in case there are no assets at
alH
"Section 377 ± of the Revised Statutes of Utah
of 1898 reads as follows :
'Wills umst be proved and letters testaInentary or of ad1ninistration granted:
If the decedent be a resident of the
state, in the county in which he had his residence at the tiine of his death.
'(1)

'(2) If the decedent be a non-resident of
the state: First, in the county in which he
Inay have died leaving estate therein; second,
in any county in which any part of the estate
Inay be, the decedent not having left estate
in the county in which he died, or having
died without the state.
' (3) In all other cases, in the county
where application for letters is first made.'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The authorities seein to be divided on the
question of whether a claim for death by wrongful act is an asset of the estate of the deceased.
We think the weight, however, leans to the side
that it is. In view of the last paragraph of section 377 4 we deern it is not necessary to follow
either line, as the Legislature evidently had in
mind cases in which the deceased ·was not .a resident, nor did he leave property in this state. We
think that the case at bar is covered by this provision of the statute. If there should be nothing
which the administrator could legally do, it could
harm nobody. If there should be something which
an administrator ought to do, then the appointment would be necessary.
"We hold that the appoinhnent of the respondent as administrator by the district court
was correct, and the action of the lower court
in refusing to set aside the appointment "·as correct, and it is hereby affirrned, ''ith costs."
The language of the third sub-~ection of 73-1-:2 i~
the same as the language interpreted in Tasanen Estate.
It is subruitted that the Tasanen decision i~ conclu~ive
as to jurisdiction of the Pro bate Court to appoint an
adrninistrator.
~inee Ta~mwn

there

lw~

been one additional interpretation of tlH' ~Pction hy the Court. It is In re Lozrham's /•.~'state, 30 Utah ~;{(), S3 Pae. ±!5. The Court
SlH~ei l'ieall~· affinned the holding whieh it had made
in thP Ta~<UIPH decision. The language in the Lowham
cast' is .as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"'While a clai1n for damages for death by
wrongful act is not a general asset of the estate
under the foregoing provisions of the Wyoming
statutes, we think it is a sufficient as.set of the
estate for the purpose of appointing an administrator. This court, in effect, so held in the case
of In re Estate of Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 Pac.
984. The doctrine declared in that case is not
only in harmony with the great weight of authority, but is, we think, supported by the better reason. Brown v. Railroad Co., 97 Ky. 228, 30 S.W.
639; Findlay v. Railroad Co., 106 Mich. 700, 64
N.W. 732; Hutchins v. Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 5,
46 N.W. 79; Merkle v. Bennington (Mich.) 35
N.W. 846; Griswold v. Griswold (Ala) 29 South.
-1:37; Railway Co. c. Reeves (Ind.App.) 35 N.E.
199; Robertson v. Railroad Co., (Wis.) 99 N.W.
433; Morris v. Railroad Co., (Iowa) 23 N. W.
1-1:3 ; 11 A. & E. Ency Law ( 2d Ed.) 828. Having
detennined that a claim for da1nages for death by
wrongful act, under the statutes of Wyoming,
is at least a special asset of the estate, the next
question presented is, can the right thus given by
the Wyo1ning statute be enforced in this jurisdiction through the 1nedium of an ad1ninistrator
appointed by the courts of this state? This question was squarely presented and decided by this
court in the case of Utah Sav. & Trust Co. vs.
Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah, 299, 73 Pac.
52-1:.
'"In view of the elaborate discussion of this
hranch of the 0ase by appellant, in its brief, we
have again given the subject careful consideration, and while there a ppe.ars to be some conflict
in the authorities on this question, the doctrine
declared in the case of Utah Sav. & Trust Co. v.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Diamond Coal & Coke Co., supra, is upheld by the
the decided weight of authority. Morris v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. (Iowa) 23 N.W. 143; Stewart v. B. & 0. R. Co., 168 U.S. 447, 18 Sup. Ct. 105,
42 L. Ed. 537; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S
11, 26 L. Ed. 439; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hurd, 108
Fed. 116, 47 C. C. A. 615, 56 L. R. A. 193; Louisville & N. R.R. v. Shivell's Adrn'r (Ky.) 18 S.vV.
944; Sargent v. Sargent (Mass.) 47 N.E. 121. It
being admitted tl~at the proceedings leading up
to the issuance of letters of administration to
A. I. Stone were in accordance with the provisions
of the statute regulating such proceedings, we are
of the opinion, and so hold, that the District Court
of Weber County had jurisdiction to issue said
letters, and that it did not err in dismissing appellant's petition to have them revoked."
In Bancoft's Probate Practice, Volume 1, Chapter
2, Section 30 page 57 it states:
"The sole purpose of instituting probate proceedings may, however, be to obtain necessary
authority to com1nence a suit to recover for the
conversion of the only property of the estate,
or a suit to set aside a conveyance 1nade by the
testator prior to his death. And where the sole
property of a decedent is an equitable claim, the
court 1nay, in its discretion, treat this as property
and grant letters of ad1ninistration. There is
some doubt, however, as to whether the existence
of assets is jurisdictional. ~-\ccording to the better
vit>w, it is not~ the question is one of property and
for the PxPreise of a sound discretion upon the
part of the eonrt to which application is n1ade.
\Vht>m'vt>r, at least, there is a possible right of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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action as for wrongful death, or in re8ped of an:'
claim or chose in Hction upon which a fair-minded
attorney would advise a client to bring suit, it
would seem that t;uch circumstance alone, in the
absence of some inhibiting statute, should be and
is sufficient to W<. rrant the assurnption of jurisdiction and the issr;.ance of letters."
Bancroft cites as aP :hority for the statement just
quoted the Utah cases Y:hich are cited above narnely,

In re Lowham's Estate a:1d In re Tasanen's Estate.
The Lowharn and T.asrnen cases have been relied upon
and accepted as sound au):hority. The Court, of course, is
familiar with quiet title practice in the State where an
administrator is appointed soley for the purpose of
showing that there was no assets in the estate but that
due to some transaction during the life of the deceased
there was what appeared on record to be some kind of
an interest in property. If the existence of property is
necessary then in the quiet title action where title is
quieted and there is no right in the estate the appointment of the .administrator would, of course, be void and
the action to quiet title of no effect.
This Court, on one occasion, pointed out that sin<:u
the appointment of an adrninistrator was largely an in
rem action on the part of the Court that if there were
no assets then there could be no harm done and no one
would be hurt by the appointrnent. This particular
aspect of the Utah Code and this Court's interpretation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was conrmented upon in the case of In re Lamu~tt's
Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P. 2d. 649, where the following
language indicates the principal was set forth:
"The guardianship of a person having no
estate would partake largely of personal eleInents; but the appointlnent of a guardian solely
for the determination of the nature and quantun1
of an estate, like an .ad1ninistration of an estate,
is an action in rein. Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah
574, 106 P. 522, 37 L.R.A., N.S., 368. In re Estate
of Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 P. 984."
It is submitted that in the
Lowhmn and Lamont c.ases there
the jurisdiction of the Probate
administrator even though there
aHsets in the estate.

light of the Tasanen,
can be no doubt about
Court to appoint an
did not appear to be

B. THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE PROBATE COURT REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH.

A recent develop1nent in the law of autmnobiles concerns the correlation of the Kon-Resident :Motorists Statute, 41-12-8 U.C.A. 1953, and the survival statutes, such
as the provisions in Section 78-11-12, U.C.A. 1953.
An examination of the two legislative inactlnents
would indicate that what wa~ intended was cornplete
coverage regardle~~ of whether a person lived or died
or wa~ a rt>~ident or a non-resident of the State of Utah
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if injury was eaused within lTtah by his negligence then
the injured person would be entitled to recover within
this State for such injuries.
The correlation of the two statutes has caused conconcern in other states, but it is respectfully

~iderable

sub1nitted, should not cause difficulty here. The cases
rited in the preceding sub point would indi0ate that it
is not necess.ary for a deceased person to have estate
within the State of Utah in order for an administrator
to be appointed.
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the problem suggests itself to the practical sense of the Court to carry
out the Legislative intention. Two decisions which have
solved the practical problmn of the appoinhnent of the
administrator .and the bringing of an action in the State
where the accident causing injury has occurred are In

r0

V'ilas' Estate, 166 Ore. 115, 110 P. 2d, 940, and In re
Fagin's Estate, ____ Iow.a ____ 66 N.W. 2d, 920.
The Iowa Supre1ne Court considered at length attempb by an ad1ninistrator to bring before the court
the facts that there was a policy of indemnity insurance
and by wh01n the insurance policy had been issued. This
difficulty with which the Iowa court w.as concerned has
been eliu1inated in our case. There has been presented
a copy of the inde1nnity agree1nent between the insurSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ance cmnpany and the deceased.
The Suprerne Court of Iowa set forth in its decision
the cmnmon sense and practical solution to the problem
which is now before this court. The one basic fact that
the Supreme Court of Iowa did not have before it was
the contractual obligation on the part of the insuranre
company to defend the deceased or her estate in every
State of the rnion and to appear on her behalf and to
hold her harrnless against judgment which might be
entered in any State of the Union. This particular fact
it is subrnitted is of extreme in1portance and should be
considered by the court in arriving at a fair and equitable decision. Even without that fact before it the Iowa
court came to a conclusion that the administrator should
be appointed within the State of Iowa and that legal
actions could properly be cmnrnenced against him there
where the accident had occurred.
Its decision and reasoning which 1s 1n several respects sin1ilar to the principles which have been set down
by our Utah Suprerne Court in the Tasanen estate case
is as follows:
•· (10) VII. Finally, it should be renlembered that proceedings such as are involved here,
seeking the appoinbnent of adrninistrators, are
not adversary nor personal. They are special
proceedings in rern. 33 C.J.S. Executors and
Adn1inistrators, Sec. 50; 21 ~-\m. Jur., Executors
and Adn1inistrators, Sec. 1~. The legality of the
.appointruent is not dependent upon acquiring
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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personal jurisdiction of any non-resident by personal or substituted service.
"This is nut an action against a non-resident
such as Inight have been brought against 1fr. Fagin had he survived the collision in which the
Pilgers clai1n the:, were injured. Nor is it an
action against the ad1ninistrator of Mr. Fagin' d
estate in Illinois. The Legislation .assuming to
Inake such actions possible is in no way involved
here.
"The Iowa ad1uinistrator has jurisdiction only
of whatever property of the estate may be in
Iowa. If it shall develop there is none, or that
Pilger's have no enforceable claims, decedent's
general estate represented by appellant will have
suffered no loss. Nor will appellant and the
estate he represents suffer any da1nage if the
Pilger clai1ns be established. Appellee (Iowa administrator) will have recourse only .against the
Iowa property, viz., whatever insurance coverage
decedent carried on his automobile subject to
such clai1ns. No one clai1ns any other property
is threatened.
"In ultinmte effect appellant is not the real
party in interest. The real p.arty is the insurance
company and the real issue whether it must defend in Iowa where the collision occurred, or in
decedent's hmne jurisdiction where there is pending general adrninistration on his estate.
"A consideration of the entire record convinces us the decision of the trial court must be
affinned and it is so ordered."
This Court has clearl:r recognized that the right
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of a plaintiff to choo~e the place of trial is a substantial
right and when he choose.s as his forum place where the
accident occurred then all of the reasons and considerations behind the venue statutes and the doctrine of forum
non conveniens should apply. See Petersen v. Ogden

Union Railway and Depot Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d
744; Mooney v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., ____ Utah ____ 221 P. 2d 628.
POINT II
RESPONDENT HAS COVENANTED TO DEFEND THE
ACTION OF RAWLINKIEWICZ IN UTAH.

One of the grounds the respondent cites in the
petition to revoke the letters of administration is that
the insurance cmnpany would not respond to any judgInent obtained against the Estate of Leigh within the
State of Utah.
This contention, it

i~

respectfully subn1itted,

out any 1nerit whatsoever.

i~

with-

The policy of insur.anee

which covered the autonwbile driven by the deceased
is the docuntent which will control the rights of the
ad1ninistrator and the obligations of the respondent. The
insurance eompany ~hould not be pennitted to say to
this Court, as a ground for revoking the letters of adntinistration, that it will refuse to abide by and c.arry
out it~ obligation~ solemnly undertaken in the policy.
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rl,he insuring agreeu1ent sub-paragraph II provides
that the insurance co1npany (a) shall defend any suit
against the insured arising out of a use of an automobile
and which results in bodily injury or property damage.
Sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph II of the
policy at page 1 also re(1uires of the insurance company
that it pay all bonds or preiniuins that Inay be necessary and all expenses such as costs and any expenses
such as attorney's fees, etc. This particular clause contains no territorial li1nitation whatsoever and it would
appear that these costs of defense under the contract
would beL paid regardless of where the accident occurs.
Clause VIII on page 2 of the policy sets forth the
provision that the policy applies to accidents while the
automobile is within the United States of America, its
territories or possessions, Canada or Newfoundland, or
even when it is being transported between ports of the
territories named.
A specially significant portion of the policy is found
on page 3, paragraph numbered 8 entitled "Financial
Responsibility Laws, Coverages A and B."
"Such insurance as is afforded by this policy
for bodily injury liability or property damage
liability shall emuply with the provisions of the
nwtor vehicle finaneial responsibility law of any
state or province which shall be applicable with
respect to any such liability arising out of the
ownership, nmintenance or use of the automobile
during the policy period, to the extent of the
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coverage and lirnits of liability required by such
law, but in no event in excess of the limits of
liability stated in this policy. The insured agrees
to reimburse the company for any payment made
by the company which it would not have been
obligated to make under the terms of this policy
except for the agreement contained in this paragraph."
The provisions of the policy of insurance show
beyond possible doubt that the respondent had contracted
to defend lawsuits and to be financially responsible for
any losses which arose out of a use of an automobile by
deceased Leigh.
These contractual provisions, appellant respectfully
submits, are a cornplete answer to the allegations on
the part of the respondent that to defend a lawsuit in
the State of Utah brought against the Estate of Leigh
irnposes upon respondent hardships and would be unfair
or inequitable to it.
Deceased paid a pre1nimn for her policy, the respondent has received payment in full for the benefits
which it agreed to provide for her. It was paid for the
anticipated hardships .and expense which it would be
required to incur should the accident resulting in liability
on the part of the insured occur in a state in which the
respondent was not qualified to do business.
It would have been a sirnple 1natter for the respondent to provide in its poliey that no suit \vould be defended
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vxtept in states where it had qualified to do business

and ,,·here it had a local agent who could be served with
a smmnons. It did not so provide. It provided that it
would afford to the insured, during her lifetime and to
her estate upon her death, protection against clai1ns
which would happen any place in the United States.
Appellant respectfully sub1nits that the respondent
having undertaken to defend actions throughout the
lTnited States and Canada should not be permitted to
clain1 that to perfonn its contractual obligations imposes
a hardship upon it, that it should not be required to bear.
POINT III
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE CAN ONLY BE SERVED
BY PERMITTING SUIT IN UTAH ON INJURIES SUFFERED
IN UTAH.

This is a relatively new field of law which, it is
respectfully sub1nitted, the Court should approach with
an eye single to accmnplishing the purpose the Legisla hue had in mind.
It is clearly established by 78-11-12 U.C.A. 1953
that the estate of the deceased negligent person should
be made responsible for the damage which the negligence has caused. It cle.arly established as public policy
h~.; -11-12-8 F.C.A. 1953 that non-residents should be required to defend actions arising out of automobile accidents happening within the State. The two statutes
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tablish a legislative purpose of ntaking the estate~ of
non-residents responsible in Utah for dmnages caused
by their negligence.
Our statutes which govern cmnparable actions are
familiar to the Court. In them it is not necessary that
the defendant have property in order for a personal
representative to be appointed so that a proceeding can
go forward. As an exan1ple, note the following statute:
Rule 17 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure read
as follows:
"(b) INFANTS OR INCOMPETENT PERSONS. When an infant or an insane or incompetent person is a party, he must .appear either
by his general guardian, or by a guardian ad litem
appointed in the particular case by the court in
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem
rnay be appointed in any case when it is deemed
by the court in which the action or proceeding is
prosecuted, expedirnt to represent the infant, insane or incornpetent person in the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general
guardian and may have appeared by him. In an
action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint
a guardian ad litem for an~· unknown party who
rnight be an infant or an incornpetent person."
'Phe reasoning and purposes of our Non-Resident
:Motorist Statute should be considered by the Court. Section -t-1-l~-S lT.C.A. 1953 provides that where a nonresident opPrah's a motor Yl'llicle within the State of
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l'tah, the oper.ation of the vehicle serves as an appointment h:, the non-re~ident of the Secretary of State of
the State of Utah to be his true and lawful attorney
upon whmn all legal process 1nay be served in any action
or proceeding against the non-resident growing out of
his use or operation of the nwtor vehicle within the State
of Utah.
Our legislature ha~ atte1npted to work out a systen1
which will insure that a person injured by the negligence
of a non-resident nwtorist can be indemnified through
the institution of a legal action within the State of Utah.
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the policy should be carried out by Court decision when to do so is in cornplete
harmony with established principles of law.
The re~pondent in thi~ ca~e would have the Court
determine that because it i~ not qualified to do business
within the State the Court should disn1iss an action which
has been connnenced against a non-resident whose negligence has caused injury to a resident of the State of
l'tah. vVhat difference should it Blake where the respondent i~ qualified to do busine~s )? It cannot be a
part:~ to the actions under any circun1stance. The residence of the respondent or the State where it is qualified to do business is cmnpletely innnaterial. Appellant
does not believe at thi~ ~tage of proceedings the respondent even has ~uch an intere~t as to be able to object to
the appoinhuent. Section 75-1-!--1-l: U.C.A. 1953 gr.ants
only to parties

intere~ted

the right to object. But assu1n-
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ing it does have a right to object what difference can its
place of business Inake ~ This consideration is especially
immaterial when one considers the provisions of the
insurance policy.
The new N on-abatmnent Statute in the case of a
deceased wrongdoer, the Non-resident Service Act, the
Probate Code and Title, and the Venue Statute, 78-13-7
U.C.A. 1953 would appear to show clearly the public
policy of the State of Utah. The statutes establish the
public policy which requires that a deceased wrongdoer
shall be responsible for any damage caused by his
negligence at the place where the damage occurred.
The State Legislature in 1953, when it passed Section 78-11-12, intended as the language states "that the
person injured shall have a cause of action against the
personal representative of the wrongdoer." The cause
of action it created it certainly thought would be within
the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah. It
also semns reasonable to suppose with insurance so widespread and financial responsibility so well established
it did not envision that before such a wrongdoer could
be responsible he n1ust have assets other than the insurance rights in his estate within the State of Utah.
lf the Court should sustain the position of respondent in this ntatter it would cast grave doubt upon all
of the quiet title actions. It is sub1nitted the Court should
follow the r.rasanen ease, supra, and the Fagin case,
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~upra.

lf there are no .assets within this State then there
ean be no dmnage done by the appointnwnt of an administrator. The Court in the Tasanen decision, supra,
recognized the practical side of this problen1 and held
that it was only for the purpose of having leg.al repre~entation of the deceased's estate within the jurisdiction
of this Court that rnade necessary the appointment of
an administrator. The smne thing is true where insane
or minor persons who have no property are sued.

In this case, on behalf of Leigh, it is necessary that
within the State of Utah an administrator appear to
protect her interests. As a practical matter the respondent will be here to defend the Leigh Estate because of
contractural obligations which it had with Leigh during
her lifetime.
CONCLUSIONS

It is respectfully .subrnitted that this Court should
reverse the action of the Trial Court in revoking and
vacating the Letters of Adu1inistration of David K.
\Vatkiss and should order said Court to restore said
David K. \Vatkiss to his fonner status as the administrator of the Estate of Phyllis Ros.ander Leigh.
Respectfully subrnitted,
KING and HUGHES
By Dwight L. King
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